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Abstract
In this thesis I set up a standard New Economic Geography model and estimate
it in the regional context of the European Union. The analysis underlines the
clear core-periphery structure of Europe, but also identies forces that hint at a
catching-up of lesser developed peripheral regions. While regions that are close to
the geographic center on average have a much higher market access, regions far
from the center can improve their market access over the time period of 1999 - 2009
relative to their initial position. I estimate and evaluate the impact of European
Union Cohesion Policy on this process and do not nd the positive developments
to be caused by or connected to the nancial facilities of the European Union
Regional Policy.
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1 Introduction
\The Community shall have as its task [...] to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of eco-
nomic activities [...], the raising of the standard of living and quality of life,
and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States."
| Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (1957)
The European Union has had a profound impact on the Economic Geography of the
European Continent. The creation of the community in 1958 with the Treaty of Rome
(1957) marked the starting point of an ever closer political and economic integration
of a growing number of countries. In 2012, with now 27 member states, the political
entity has more than half a billion inhabitants speaking in 23 ocial languages, that
account for approximately 20% of the world's GDP (European Commission, 2008a).
Although the community has evolved into a highly integrated union, economic and
social disparities have remained high. 43% of the European Union's economic output
is generated in just 14% of its territory (European Commission, 2008c), particularly
in the core situated in the geographic center of Europe. The peripheral regions are
characterized by on average higher unemployment rates and a lower GDP per capita,
emphasizing the strong core-periphery structure.
The economic integration of Europe has been at the heart of the entire integration
process. The removal of borders and the introduction of one market for goods, the
possibility for citizens of the EU to roam, live and work freely in any member country
are known to have a vast impact on the economic geography of the continent (Crozet
& Lafourcade, 2009, p. 79). The introduction of a single currency in wide parts of the
political union, further reducing barriers for the internal market, has surely contributed
to this end. In the context of the monetary integration and in light of Mundell (1961)'s
criteria for an optimal currency area, Dall'erba (2008) recognizes that when \countries
loos[e] control over monetary policy, cohesion policies [are] sometimes seen as the only
tool to cushion asymmetric shocks and structural problems."
Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Community and later the European
Union has the task \to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development
of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability,
an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it" (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Article 2). With establishing the Structural
Funds and later the Cohesion Fund, this task received nancial repower.
EU regional policy has the aim to promote cohesion in economic, social and territorial
terms for regions in the European Union. The size of the allocated funds is regularly
about a third of the entire EU budget (European Commission, 2008b). The funds
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are allotted via dierent mechanisms to account for dierent objectives. In the pe-
riod of 2000 - 2006 the two most important among others were dened as (European
Communities, 2004):
Objective 1, for which roughly 80 percent of funds were transferred to regions, was the
aim in NUTS2 regions where the GDP per capita is less than 75 percent of the EU25
average. Almost all regions of the new member states were covered by this objective.
The primary obstacles to prosperity in these regions were assumed to be a general low
level of investment, high unemployment and the lack of basic infrastructure.
Objective 2, for which about 16 percent of the available funds were allotted to, was
the aim in the regions that were facing a structural change in previous key sectors,
most notably declines in industrial activity and other traditional activities, leading to
unemployment.
The Cohesion Fund provided another source of infrastructure funding and co-nancing
for countries that had a GDP of less than 90% of the EU average, covering similar
areas as Objective 1.
In prior programming periods from 1989 - 1993, 1994 -1999 the aims were named dif-
ferently and varied in numbers, the general objectives were of course closely related
to the current ones. In the current period of 2007 - 2013, Objective 1 has been re-
named the convergence objective and Objective 2 is part of the competitiveness and
employment objective (European Commission, 2008a). The allocated funds are aimed
at promoting economic growth and improved competitiveness on a regional level. This
is to be achieved via several channels, most notably in infrastructure, human capital
formation and social inclusion.
These policies have naturally been subject to economic research. Most of the econo-
metric evaluations of European Union Regional Policy and its economic impact are
situated in the Economic Growth literature, employing very dierent techniques lead-
ing to no coherent picture of the results (Dall'erba & Le Gallo, 2008). Among the
notable contributions are Rodriguez-Pose & Fratesi (2004), employing a cross-sectional
panel data analysis nding spending on infrastructure through Objective 1 funds to
have an insignicant eect and only investments in human capital and education to
have a medium run signicant positive return. Becker et al. (2010) exploit the afore-
mentioned threshold of a GDP below 75% of the average GDP for the eligibility for
Objective 1 regions to identify causal eects of the receipt of funds on economic growth
in the respective regions. Other authors, such as Dall'erba & Le Gallo (2008) and Gallo
et al. (2011) employ spatial econometric techniques to account for spatial linkages in
the estimations, however also reporting at best mixed results.
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The main strand in economic research that is concerned with spatial features is of
course Economic Geography, analyzing the roots and eects of agglomeration economies.
The core-periphery concept, of apparent interest when studying the case of Europe,
has received wide attention at least since the seminal contribution of Krugman (1991),
a turning point for the henceforth New Economic Geography, emphasizing the inter-
play between proximity to markets for demand and supply, prices for input factors and
trade costs.
The notion of market access has created a burgeoning literature with a wide range of
topics. Hanson (1998, 2005) and Redding & Venables (2004) were successful in porting
the theoretical advances to empirical tests. Redding & Venables (2004)'s econometric
approach has been particularly inuential, deriving a structural equation that relates
wages to the proximity to demand and supplier markets, and achieving to explain a
large part in the international variation of income with geographic features. Head &
Mayer (2011) extend this analysis over a long period of time to nd a long-term impact
of market access on the economic development of countries.
Hanson (1998, 2005)'s work focusses on the subnational level, estimating the eects
of market access on wage dierentials for US counties. Other research applying this
theoretical framework to country-level data include Brakman et al. (2004), who study
the case of Germany.
A dierent strand of the economic geography literature exploits historical coincidences
as a form of natural experiments: Redding & Sturm (2008) use the German partition
and reunication between the end of World War 2 and 1990 showing the importance
of market access through a decline of population in border areas, as suggested by the
theory. Davis & Weinstein (2002) test the durability of economic geography against
external shocks, analyzing the population distributions before and after allied bomb-
ings of World War 2 on Japanese cities, nding a strong persistence of established
economic geographical patterns.
In the European context, a number of works stand out. Head & Mayer (2004) use a
similar framework as Redding & Venables (2004) to develop a model of location choice
for rms, and show using data on Japanese investments in Europe that investments
are made \where the markets are", focussing the research on the backward linkages
to demand sources. Crozet (2004) sheds light on the forward linkages, developing and
estimating a model of individual location choice with interregional migration data for
ve European countries. Combes & Overman (2004) provide a survey over literature
and open questions over for the specic case of Europe.
Breinlich (2006) follows closely the methodology and focus of research of Redding &
Venables (2004) and applies the framework to European regions, identifying human
capital accumulation as a channel through which market access inuences wages. Head
& Mayer (2006), also focussing on European regions, modify the approach slightly and
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are looking at wage and employment responses to proximity to markets for dierent
industries.
This paper also makes use of the Redding & Venables (2004) methodology and through
its European focus is closely related to Breinlich (2006) and Head & Mayer (2006).
It extends the analysis to all 248 regions of the 25 member states of 2006 that were
located in continental Europe. Analyzing the determinants for the economic geography
of Europe, I estimate the impact of Objective 1 (and Cohesion Fund) and Objective 2
facilities on the dynamics and determinants of the distribution of income.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 I set up the theoretical framework in
which I am to analyze the Economic Geography of Europe. The following sections
are concerned with the empirical testing of this model, where the trade equation is
estimated and market access is calculated (Section 3) and these results then used in
the estimation of the wage equation (Section 4). In section 5 I draw the link to the
policy dimension and estimate the role of European Union Regional Policy in the
determinants for change of the distribution of income across Europe. Section 6 nally
concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section I set up a standard New Economic Geography model, modied for
the purpose of an analysis of regional wage dierences. The framework is fundamen-
tally based on Fujita et al. (1999), and comparable to Redding & Venables (2004),
while highlighting the regional approach similar to Head & Mayer (2006) and Breinlich
(2006). I loosely follow the notation of Combes et al. (2008) for its ease of use and
readability.
The model is made up by R regions, where in each region r there are nr rms that
produce their variety of a good qr. The consumer in region r, who derives his income
Yr from wages wr and rent on capital xr, and spends a fraction r on the produced
products from region r and all other regions s 2 R. In the following, r is to be perceived
as the domestic region, whereas s is a foreign region, simplifying the understanding of
the model.
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2.1 Supply Side
As usual, the model consists of a supply and demand side. On the supply side, for the
rm in region r to produce one unit of its product, it is faced with a function
qr = AL

rX

r   a (1)
with +  = 1
where in the Cobb-Douglas function-like component Lr is the labor input,  the as-
sociated labor share in income, Xr the input of capital and  the share of capital in
income. A is a standard technological parameter and a is a xed input which deter-
mines the degree of increasing returns to scale, both are assumed to be identical across
all regions.
The rm maximizes the production of its variety qr while operating under a cost
constraint. The optimization problem is therefore:
max
Lr;Xrqr
= ALrX

r   a
s.t. Cr = wrLr + xrXr
The optimization leads to the cost function
Cr = w

r x

r (qr + a)
For the rm this implies a prot
r =
RX
s=1
prqrs   wr xr (qr + a)
This introduces the notion of distance, as qrs is the quantity of a variety qr that is
produced in region r and then sold in (or exported to) region s. Splitting the cost into
xed and marginal cost this becomes
r =
RX
s=1
prqrs  mrqr   Fr (2)
with the marginal cost mr = w

r x

r (3)
and the xed cost Fr = aw

r x

r (4)
The operating prot of a rm in region r exporting to region s in equilibrium is then
rs = (p

r  mr) rsqrs (5)
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with an equilibrium mill price pr, the equilibrium quantity qrs and trade cost rs  1.
The trade costs are ad valorem, or so-called iceberg trade costs, meaning a fraction of
rs 1
rs
of the shipped goods \melts" on the way from region r to s. Under increasing
returns to scale and imperfect competition, the rm establishes an equilibrium price
for the consumer1 of
prs = rsp

r = rsmr


   1

(6)
receiving a markup of  1 over the marginal cost. Substituting (6) into (5) yields
rs = mr
rsq

rs
   1 (7)
2.2 Demand side
On the consumer side, the equilibrium demand qrs for goods in region s from region r
is derived from the consumer's utility maximization. The agent is assumed to have a
preference for consuming all available varieties from all regions R, characterized by a
CES utility function:
max
qrs
Us =
 
RX
r=1
nrq
 1

rs
! 
 1
(8)
s.t.
RX
r=1
nrprsqrs = sYs
As described above, Ys is the income in region s, s the share of income devoted to the
consumption of the considered good,  the elasticity of substitution, nr the number of
varieties in region r. The optimization leads to
qrs = p
 
rs
sYsPR
r=1 nrp
1 
rs
(9)
which can be further simplied by dening a price index Ps
qrs = p
 
rs sYsP
 1
s (10)
with Ps =
 
RX
r=1
nrp
1 
rs
! 1
1 
(11)
The equilibrium quantity exported from region r to s is therefore negatively dependent
on its price, and positively dependent on the share of income devoted to consumption
of this good, discounted by the price level in the importing region.
1Essentially the CIF price.
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Multiplying (10) on both sides with nrprs yields
nrp

rsq

rs = nrp
1 
rs sYsP
 1
s (12)
which I will call the trade equation in accordance with previously mentioned authors
using a similar setup and following Redding & Venables (2004). This equation will be
estimated in section 3.1.
Returning to the rms' prot function (2), summing over all exports, that is to say all
operating prots (7), from region r and subtracting the xed costs (4) then yields a
total prot of
r =
RX
s
rs   Fr
=
RX
s
m1 r 
1 
rs 
  (   1) 1 sYsP  1s   Fr (13)
Rearranging terms and repackaging the constants into c = 1


 1
1 
yields
r = cm
1 
r MAr   Fr (14)
with calling the sum over income of importing regions s discounted by respective price
indexes and trade costs themarket access following the notation of Redding & Venables
(2004):2
MAr =
RX
s=1
sYsP
 1
s 
1 
rs (15)
Assuming zero prot in the long-run, the prot equation (14) can be rearranged to
r = cm
1 
r MAr   Fr = 0
, mr =

cMAr
Fr
 1
 1
Inserting the marginal cost mr and xed cost Fr from the optimization program of the
2Head & Mayer (2011) provide a discussion over naming this term market access or real market
potential
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rm, equations (3) and (4), and solving for wr yields
cMAr
Fr
 1
 1
= wr x

r
wr =
 c
a
 1

MA
1

r x
  

r (16)
which is the familiar wage equation named by Fujita et al. (1999).
So far the approach is purely static. As described above, one of the aims of this paper
is to analyze the change over time, in particular the change of wages. I therefore
introduce a time dimension and divide observations in time t by the previous one t 1:
wr;t
wr;t 1
=

ctat 1
ct 1at
 1


xr;t
xr;t 1
  


MAr;t
MAr;t 1
 1

The exponents , , the shares of factor returns, are assumed not to change over
time.Taking the logarithm, I obtain the rst dierences of the wage equation, describing
the growth rate of the remuneration for the immobile factor:
lnwr;t   lnwr;t 1 = 1

(ln ct   ln at   ln ct 1 + ln at 1)  

(lnxr;t   lnxr;t 1)
+
1

(lnMAr;t   lnMAr;t 1)
which I abbreviate with:
 lnwr;t =
1

( ln ct  ln at)  

lnxr;t +
1

lnMAr;t (17)
The change in the remuneration for the immobile factor, namely wages, is therefore
positively dependent on the change in the elasticity of substitution, negatively depen-
dent on the change of the degree of IRS and a change in the remuneration of mobile
capital, while a change in market access increases wages. The former three appear
reasonable, particularly any relative change in the remuneration for the mobile input,
capital, means relatively less remuneration for the immobile input ceteris paribus and
a higher degree of increasing returns to scale, essentially higher xed costs, implies a
lower number of rms resulting in lower wages. The latter is intuitive as well: greater
market access implies a more protable environment for the rm, thus the ability to
pay higher wages.
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3 Estimation of the Trade Equation
In the previous section 2, two equations have been highlighted: the trade equation
(12) and the wage equation (16). These two are fairly standard in the literature, while
less common is the rst dierence of the wage equation, equation (17), describing the
growth rate of wages.
In order to estimate the model, two stages are necessary. In the rst stage, I estimate
the trade equation, essentially a standard gravity equation, with two dierent but re-
lated approaches, which I call RV method after Redding & Venables (2004) and HM
method after Head & Mayer (2004) as coined by Paillacar (2009). Both methodolo-
gies make use of xed eects for importers and exporters to obtain estimates for the
construction of the market access MAr in section 3.5, but dier in the data and trade
costs variables used, which will be explained below in section 3.2.
In a second stage in sections 4 and 5, I use these constructed variables for the estima-
tions of equations (16) and (17), the wage equation and the respective growth rate of
wages.
3.1 Econometric specication
The trade equation is estimated in a similar fashion as Redding & Venables (2004),
using xed eects for importer and exporter to capture what Anderson & van Wincoop
(2003) call multilateral resistance term.
Recalling equation (12) from section 2 and separating the CIF price into FOB price
and trade costs, the trade equation becomes
nrp

rsq

rs =
 
nrp
1 
r
  
1 rs
  
sYsP
 1
s

(18)
The left hand side is the total value of all varieties shipped from region r to s, in other
words the total value of exports. The rst term on the right hand side is exporter spe-
cic, the number and local prices of domestic varieties. The second term is trade costs
between the two regions. The third term nally is importer specic, the importer's
share of income allotted to the considered good and the foreign price level. Condensing
these attributes and introducing a time dimension yields
Xrs;t = (ir;t)(
1 
rs;t )(js;t) (19)
where Xrs;t is the bilateral trade ow from region r to s at time t and ir;t and js;t are
the exporter and importer-specic features. The latter will be used to estimate the
market capacity, the expenditure discounted by price level, of the locations. Taking
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logs yields
lnXrs;t = ln ir;t + (1  ) ln rs;t + ln js;t
I estimate this equation in both the RV method and the HM method then with
lnXrs;t = t + 1;r;tEXr + 2;s;tIMs + (1  ) 3;tTCrs
EXr is the dummy for the exporting region r, IMs is the dummy for the importing
region s and TCrs contains a number of variables responsible for transport cost. In
this case, trade costs will be assumed to depend on distances DISTrs and a shared
ocial language LANGrs. In the HM method, I also include a dummy BORDERrs
if a trade ow leaves the country, i.e. when exporter and importer regions are not
located in the same country, as intra-country trade between regions is expected to
reach dierent magnitudes than other trade ows.3 On the other hand, in the RV
method I follow Redding & Venables (2004) and include a variable CONTIGrs if two
regions are contiguous. The estimated equation is then
lnXrs;t = t + 1;r;tEXr + 2;s;tIMs + 3;tDISTrs + 4;tLANGrs + 5;tBORDERrs + rs;t
(20)
lnXrs;t = t + 1;r;tEXr + 2;s;tIMs + 3;tDISTrs + 4;tLANGrs + 5;tCONTIGrs + rs;t
(21)
for the HM method and RV method respectively, where in both i = (1  ) i.
3.2 Two Approaches for Estimation of the Trade Equation
As described, I estimate the trade equation applying two dierent approaches. Theo-
retically, both approaches are fully consistent with the framework set up in section 2.
Empirically however, as will be displayed in section 3.4, the two methodologies deliver
slightly diering results.
Redding & Venables (2004) estimate the trade equation with bilateral trade data from
all countries. Through the importer xed eect, the estimation yields an estimate for
the income discounted by price level for all locations, without the need for internal
trade data. Paillacar (2009) coins this the RV method. While this technique certainly
has the advantage of ridding the estimation of the need for internal trade data, it has a
clear disadvantage too: it does not allow for a border eect, which then can potentially
bias the estimates for other assumed trade costs.
Head & Mayer (2004) proceed dierently: they include a dummy variable for interna-
tional trade ows, creating the need for internal trade data. The dummy is designed
3See Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) for a survey on this topic.
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to capture all costs associated with the crossing of a national border, \comprising [a]
home bias in consumer preferences and government procurement, dierential technical
standards, exchange rate uncertainty, and imperfect information about potential trade
partners" (Head & Mayer, 2004, p. 962), and therefore should have a negative sign.
Paillacar (2009) names this approach the HM method. Breinlich (2006), also applying
the original framework by Redding & Venables (2004) to a select number of European
regions, adapts the approach further in exclusively using trade ows originating from
the European Union, therefore requiring only European export and production data.
In my estimation using the HM method, I proceed similar to Breinlich and use exclu-
sively data on exports and production from the 25 member states of the European
Union before the enlargement of 2007.
Except for the treatment of internal trade ows, all variables are the same. The results
in section 3.4 emphasize the technical dierences. As the exclusive use of European
data for the HM method signicantly reduces the data sample, I again follow Breinlich
(2006) and pool data to four periods: 1999 2001, 2002 2004, 2005 2007, 2008 2009.
As Breinlich notes, this also has the positive eect of reducing short-term uctuations
in the sample.
3.3 Data
For the estimation of the trade equation, equations (20) and (21), data on bilateral
trade ows and trade costs is necessary. Unfortunately, although EUROSTAT and
aliated agencies such as ESPON are providing rich regional data in many aspects,
trade data in a regional detail is unavailable on a European level. While for some
European countries more ne-grained data is available and used in related research,
see e.g. Combes et al. (2005) using regional trade ows between French regions,
complete coverage for all EU member states is only available in national gures.4
Due to this constraint, I have to resort to national accounts on trade ows. The most
complete database for trade ows I nd to be UN Comtrade, and I use the cleaned
and completed BACI version from CEPII (Gaulier & Zignago, 2010). The highly
disaggregated product-level data is reaggregated to the sector level using a concordance
table from HS6 to ISIC Rev. 2.5 As previous authors I use manufacturing exports
for the estimations, hence aggregate at the ISIC Rev. 2 top-level 3 code. BACI is
accompanied by a smaller dataset that enables a distinction between true zeros and
missing values. Like Redding & Venables (2004) I add 1 for all zero trade ows to
prohibit log(0)s in the regression. As all gures are reported in thousands of dollars, a
4Related research that makes use of regional trade data from countries in other part of the world
are among others Wolf (2000) and Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) using data from US states, and
Hering & Poncet (2010), using regional Chinese trade data.
5http : ==www:macalester:edu=research=economics=page=haveman=
Trade:Resources=tradeconcordances:html
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negligible $1:000 trade ow is therefore assumed to take place. The dataset treats the
countries of Luxembourg and Belgium as one. Luxembourg is hence assumed to be a
region situated in Belgium.
As previously elaborated, when estimating the trade equation with the RV method,
no information on internal trade ows is necessary. However, for the HM method,
this is the case. Like Head & Mayer (2004, 2006) and Breinlich (2006), I follow Wei
(1996) and calculate internal trade as the dierence between manufacturing production
and exports. Data on manufacturing production is derived from the OECD STAN
database.
As for the required information on trade costs, I make use of two databases provided
by CEPII, the Distances database (Mayer & Zignago, 2011) and the Gravity database
(Head et al. , 2010), using information on the location of capitals for the calculation
of distances, shared ocial languages and common borders with trading partners.
However, as this paper is concerned with European regions, I have created an analogous
database for European NUTS2 region of the EU25 using the same strategy as detailed
in Mayer & Zignago (2011) applied to European regions. I include 248 regions that lie
on the European continental shelf.6
Following Paillacar (2009), for distances I use simple great circle distances. Head
& Mayer (2002) note that this overestimates the home bias in trade and propose
a population-weighted distance measure. Paillacar however nds that ad hoc great
circle distances do not signicantly alter the estimations, while recognizing that data
on internal population is highly incomplete. This is even more true on a regional
level, where the classication of regions is already somewhat ambiguous.7 For internal
distances a standard approach is to use the area of the region and assuming it to have a
disk-like shape, for which the average distance is calculated as DISTrr =
2
3
p
arear=.
3.4 Results from Estimation of the Trade Equation
Estimating the trade equations (20) and (21), the results between the two approaches
dier in the expected form. Table 1 shows the results of the estimation with the RV
method. Distance, a common language, and a shared border (contiguity) together can
explain about 76% of variation in the data. All coecients have the expected sign and
are economically and statistically highly signicant for all years.8 The coecients on
6I exclude any overseas territories or departements, Portuguese and Spanish islands in the Atlantic
Ocean, Spanish enclaves in Northern Africa, and Gibraltar. See Appendix A for further information.
7The Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics for European regions classies by population
size: NUTS2, which is used in this paper, is a body of land that is inhabited by a population of size
between 800.000 and 3.000.000 and is mainly based on institutional divisions in member states.
8As annual data has been grouped into four periods of two to three years, standard errors are
clustered around importer-exporter pairs. Signicance is reported with t-statistics based on cluster-
robust standard errors.
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Table 1: Trade equation RV Method 1999 - 2009
Regressor 1999 - 2001 (1) 2002 - 2004 (2) 2005 - 2007 (3) 2008 - 2009 (4)
Distance -1.63011*** -1.639549*** -1.648194*** -1.59885***
(-138.1693) (-140.5560) (-136.8687) (-114.167)
Common Language 1.06157*** 1.070790*** 1.106022*** 1.02921***
(42.8597) (43.9066) (45.6562) (34.942)
Contiguity 1.28030*** 1.204572*** 1.137786*** 0.90830***
(17.5574) (16.5814) (14.9626) (12.054)
Adjusted R2 0.7602 0.7675 0.771 0.7675
Observations 97520 98185 97996 64887
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01, cluster-robust t-statistic in
round brackets (standard errors clustered around country pairs). Dependent variable is the logarithm
of trade ow, the independent variables are logarithm of distance and binary indicators for a
common language and contiguity of countries.
distance are slightly higher for all periods than in Redding & Venables (2004)9 and
marginally increase until the fourth period, which is also inline with the literature.10
The importance of contiguity between trading partners is higher than in Redding &
Schott (2003) and Redding & Venables (2004) but steadily decreasing. A common
language between trading partners, not included in the original Redding & Venables
(2004) estimation, displays no particular trend and range marginally lower than the
reported values from Breinlich (2006).
Tables 2 and 3 show the results for the estimation of the trade equation with the HM
method. While all coecients in both tables have the expected sign, the magnitude
diers tremendously. For all 25 countries of the European Union the coecient on
distance is much larger than for the old member states before the 2004 enlargement,
while the border coecient is much lower for the estimation with all member states
compared to the selection of the EU15. This result is somewhat puzzling, as it im-
plies much lower trade reductions when crossing a border in the new member state
countries compared with the old member states. The issue is most likely rooted in the
construction of internal trade data. When exclusively looking at the estimation for
the countries that were members of the EU before the enlargement of 2004, the coe-
cients are to a large extent in line with previous research: the implied trade reductions
by crossing a national border mirror Breinlich (2006)'s ndings, with values decreas-
ing from  72% in the rst period to  64% in the third period. Note however that
9Compare (Redding & Venables, 2004, p. 62, Table 1, Column 1) for the same methodology used.
10See Disdier & Head (2008) for a survey on the topic of the high negative impact of distance on
trade.
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Table 2: Trade equation HM Method 1999 - 2009
Regressor 1999 - 2001 (1) 2002 - 2004 (2) 2005 - 2007 (3) 2008 - 2009(4)
Distance -1.77024*** -1.72813*** -1.72492*** -1.71556***
(-37.7113) (-39.0121) (-34.2575) (-33.0368)
Common Language 1.09646*** 1.03010*** 1.09456*** 1.20567***
(15.5570) (14.3467) (16.2610) (14.7680)
Border -0.43596* -0.36505* -0.19536 -0.18334
(-1.9220) ( -1.8177) (-0.8426) (-0.7047)
impl. trade reduction 0.35 0.31 0.18 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.8637 0.8696 0.8674 0.88
Observations 14777 14776 14775 9847
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01, cluster-robust t-statistic in
round brackets (standard errors clustered around country pairs). Dependent variable is the logarithm
of trade ow, the independent variables are logarithm of distance and binary indicators for a
common language and the crossing of a border. Implied trade reduction is 1  exp(border).
Breinlich (2006) and Head & Mayer (2006) allow border eects to vary across dierent
countries.11 The coecients are only statistically signicant for the rst two periods.
In both estimations of EU25 and EU15 a common language plays an economically and
statistically signicant role in the determination of the size of trade ows, although
the coecient varies across time. The estimation of the trade equation with the HM
method explains between 86%   90% of the variation of trade ows. Although coe-
cients vary substantially between the estimations for the EU25 and EU15, to ensure
consistency those coecients of the estimation with all 25 countries of the European
Union are used for the calculation of the market access.
In the analysis below, mostly the results from the HM method will be used, as the
information on internal trade ows appears to be extraordinarily important in the
context of regions, as will be shown below. However, the results from the RV method
are overall similar and provide a good contrast to be used to underpin the general
ndings and highlight the dierences rooted in the construction of the two methods.
3.5 Computation of Market Access
Having obtained estimates for trade costs and importer xed eects, I can proceed to
compute the market access for all regions. However, the trade equation, as described
above, is estimated with national data. To make the step to regional market access, one
11Letting border eects vary across countries in my case led to enormous variations in the later
calculated market access. I therefore resorted to assuming a common eect, although Chen (2004)
nds signicant dierences for the eect for European countries.
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Table 3: Trade equation HM Method 1999 - 2009 for EU15 only
Regressor 1999 - 2001 (1) 2002 - 2004 (2) 2005 - 2007 (3) 2008 - 2009 (4)
Distance -1.1965275*** -1.203978*** -1.175567*** -1.181475***
(-22.4601) (-23.6480) (-19.0561) (-18.6857)
Common Language 1.1780656*** 1.116936*** 1.213514*** 1.284977***
(17.6732) (1.060122) (19.4007) (16.4424)
Border -1.2741031* -1.060122* -1.037907 -1.141489
(-6.1237) ( -4.5934) (-4.0140) (-3.8505)
impl. trade reduction -72 % -65 % -64 % -68 %
Adjusted R2 0.8954 0.9003 0.892 0.9059
Observations 8844 8844 8844 5898
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01, cluster-robust t-statistic in
round brackets (standard errors clustered around country pairs). Dependent variable is the logarithm
of trade ow, the independent variables are logarithm of distance and binary indicators for a
common language and the crossing of a border. Implied trade reduction is 1  exp(border). Note
that this estimation only includes data on EU15 countries.
critical assumption has to be made: all regions in a country share the same price-level.
While this assumption is quite strong and disregards apparent dierences (Combes
et al. , 2008), it allows to split the estimated importer country xed eect by regional
expenditure shares:
exp(IMs)
2;s =
sYs
SYS
exp(IMS)
2;S =
sYs
P 1 S
(22)
where region s is situated in the importing country S, implying Ps = PS ; 8s 2 S. The
trade equation is also estimated with national data on trade costs, so for the calculation
of region market access, the regional data is used, relying on ocial regional languages
and distances from regions to countries, other regions within the same country and
internal distances as described in section 3.3.
Recalling equation (15), the market access will then be calculated using equation (19)
accordingly for the respective time t as:
MAr;t =
RX
s=1
s;tYs;tP
 1
s;t 
1 
rs;t =
RX
s=1
(js;t)(
1 
rs;t )
)MAr;t =
RX
s=1

exp(IMs)
2;s;t(DISTrs)
3;t exp(LANGrs)
4;t exp(BORDERrs)
5;t

(23)
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Figure 1: Distance to Luxembourg and Market Access in Period 1999 - 2001
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100). Market access calculated with HM method for period from 1999 - 2001.
for the HM method and
)MAr;t =
RX
s=1

exp(IMs)
2;s;t(DISTrs)
3;t exp(LANGrs)
4;t exp(CONTIGrs)
5;t

(24)
for the RV method.
Figure 1 displays the resulting market access values of the 248 regions, using coecients
calculated with the HM method, for the period of 1999 - 2001 relative to their distance
from Luxembourg. The trend is easily visible: the further a region is located from the
geographic center of the European Union the lower is its market access. Particularly
well positioned and blessed with a high market access seem to be the metropolitan re-
gions of London (NUTS 2 codes UKI1 and UKI2) and Brussels (NUTS 2 codes BE10,
BE31 and BE24).12 Of particular interest with respect to the latter part of this paper,
section 5, is gure 2. While less clear than the relationship between distance to the ge-
ographic center and market access, it appears that regions located far from the center
12See gure 5 in appendix C for the analogous plot for market access calculated with the RV method.
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Figure 2: Distance to Luxembourg and Relative Change in Market Access 1999 - 2009
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period 2008 - 2009, relative to Luxembourg. Market access calculated with HM method.
improved their market access in the period of 2008 - 2009 relative to their initial market
access in the period of 1999 - 2001 more than those regions located closer to the center.
The dierences between the two techniques used to estimate the trade equation become
apparent when looking at table 4. Market access calculated based upon coecients
from the RV method is muss less reliant on the domestic component of trade, while the
corresponding gures for the HM method mirror the home bias in trade, with respect
to both domestic region and country, captured by the border dummy in the estimation.
Note also that the latter shows a clear trend for European regions in the composition
of their market access: Europe and the rest of the world gain shares at the expense of
the domestic region and country. In the RV method no such clear trend is visible, and
while the order of importance is equivalent to the HM method, it seems to deliver less
precise results.
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Table 4: Composition of Market Access for all period using HM method and RV method
HM method '99 - '01 '02 - '04 '05 - '07 '08 - '09
Region 12.36 11.88 11.53 11.63
Country 70.31 67.76 65.36 65.03
Europe 14.21 16.52 18.62 18.53
World 3.12 3.84 4.49 4.81
RV method '99 - '01 '02 - '04 '05 - '07 '08 - '09
Region 7.92 8.19 8.21 7.93
Country 51.56 53.53 52.62 52.11
Europe 38.30 36.25 36.93 37.24
World 2.23 2.03 2.24 2.72
Note: Market access in top half calculated with the HM method, in bottom half calculated with RV
method. Cells show average share of regional, national, European and worldwide component in
market access for all 248 regions per time period.
4 Estimation of the Wage Equation
Having obtained estimates for market access, I can proceed to apply these values in the
estimation of the wage equation (16) and the related change in wages (17). Recalling
from section 2 the wage equation (16) reads:
wr =
 c
a
 1

x
  

r MA
1

r
Taking logs and applying a time dimension yields
lnwr;t =
1

ln

ct
at

  

lnxr;t +
1

MAr;t
Recall that at can vary over time but is invariant across regions. This is then estimated
as
lnwr;t = t +
1

lnMAr;t + r;t (25)
The renumeration for the mobile input, xr;t, is captured in the error term, while the
constant t captures the time-variant at and ct. All cross-regional dierences are thus
assumed to be captured in the residual, which is a quite strong hypothesis (Redding
& Venables, 2004). In section 4.2 I therefore conduct several robustness tests.
Wages, the remuneration for the immobile factor, is proxied with GDP per capita,
following numerous related papers. As I am calculating the market access over periods,
I also take the mean GDP per capita for the respective time periods. Regional GDP
data comes from EUROSTAT.
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4.1 Baseline Estimation
Table 5: Baseline estimation wage equation 1999 - 2009
Regressor ln(GDPpc) (1) ln(GDPpc) (2) ln(GDPpc) (3) ln(GDPpc) (4)
ln(MA RV) 0.25744***
(17.1927)
ln(MA HM) 0.345281***
(18.9450)
ln(MA) P1 0.30239*** 0.38873***
(9.4554) (10.7178)
ln(MA) P2 0.267724*** 0.35773***
(8.6643) (9.6623)
ln(MA) P3 0.237804*** 0.32963***
(8.4723) (9.3684)
ln(MA) P4 0.212776*** 0.28435***
(7.9523) (8.2021)
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.2702 0.2965 0.2722 0.2978
Observations 992 992 992 992
Year 1999 - 2009 1999 - 2009 1999 - 2009 1999 - 2009
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01, t-statistic in round
brackets. Due to the nature of the regressor being itself generated from a prior regression, t-statistics
should be reported based on bootstrapped standard errors, which however could not be done. The
independent variable is the logarithm of the mean of GDP per capita in the respective period, as
described in the text. The regressors in columns (1) and (2) are the logarithms of the market access
calculated with the RV method in column (1) and HM method in column (2). The regressors in
columns (3) and (4) are the logarithm of the market access in period 1 (P1 = 1999 - 2001), period 2
(P2 = 2002 - 2004), period 3 (P3 = 2005 - 2007) and period 4 (P4 = 2008 - 2009) calculated with
the RV method in column (3) and the HM method in column (4).
Table 5 reports the results for the baseline estimation using both above described
methods. Market access is in all cases economically and statistically highly signicant
and the estimated coecients are well in line with the results from the directly related
research, Breinlich (2006) and Head & Mayer (2006) in particular. Making use of the
panel character of the data, columns (1) and (2) report the average impact of market
access on wages, with market access calculated with the RV method and HM method
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) allow the coecient to vary by period. In both
specications, the impact of market access decreases. Figure 3 plots the relationship
for the period of 1999 -2001. To a large part the downward trend of the coecient
is due to the upward movement of the distinct group of points in the lower left of
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Figure 3: GDP per capita and Market Access in 1999 - 2001
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
Market Access
G
DP
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
AT11
AT12
AT13
AT21AT22
AT31
AT32
AT33 AT34
BE10
BE21
BE22 BE23
BE24
BE25 BE31
BE32
BE33
BE34 BE35
CY00
CZ01
CZ02CZ03
CZ04
CZ05CZ06
CZ07CZ08
DE11
DE12
DE13
DE14
DE21
DE22
DE23DE24
DE25
DE26
DE27
DE30
DE41
DE42
DE50
DE60
DE71
DE72
DE73
DE80
DE9192
DE93
DE94
DEA1
A2
DEA3
DEA4
DEA5
DEB1DEB2
DEB3DEC0
DED1
DED2 DED3
DEE0
DEF0
DEG0
DK01
DK02
DK03DK04DK05
EE00
ES11
ES12
ES13
ES21ES22
ES23
ES24
ES30
ES41
ES42
ES43
ES51
ES52
ES53
ES61
ES62
FI13
FI18
FI19
FI1A
FI20
FR10
FR21
FR22
FR23FR24
FR25
FR26
FR30
FR41
FR42
43FR51FR52FR53
FR61FR62
FR63
FR71
FR72
FR81
FR82
FR83
GR11
GR12 GR13
GR14GR21
GR22
GR23
GR24
GR25
GR30
GR41
GR42
GR43
HU10
HU21
HU22
HU23
HU31HU32
HU33
IE01
IE02
ITC1 ITC2
ITC3
ITC4ITD1
ITD2ITD3
ITD4
ITD5
ITE1
ITE2ITE3
ITE4
ITF1
ITF2
ITF3
ITF4
ITF5
ITF6ITG1
ITG2
LT00
LU00
LV 0
MT00
NL11
NL12 NL13
NL21 NL22
NL23
NL31
NL32
NL33
NL34
NL41
NL42
PL11
PL12
PL21
PL22
PL31PL32
PL33PL34
PL41
PL42
PL43
PL51
PL52
PL61
PL62
PL63
PT11
PT15
PT16
PT17
PT18
SE11
SE12SE21
SE22
SE23
SE31
SE32
SE33
SI01
SI02
SK01
SK02
SK0
SK04
UKC1
UKC2
UKD1
UKD2
UKD3
UKD4
UKD5
UKE1
UKE2
UKE3
UKE4
UKF1
UKF2
UKF3
UKG1
UKG2
UKG3
UKH1
UKH2
UKH3
UKI1
UKI2
UKJ1
UKJ2
UKJ3
UKJ4
UKK1
UKK2
UKK3
UKK4
UKL1
UKL2UKM2
UKM3
UKM5
UKM6
UKN0
50
00
10
00
0
20
00
0
40
00
0
25 50 100 200 400 800
Note: Average GDP per capita in 1999 - 2001 (2010 EURO) and the regions' market access (LU00 =
100) in 1999 - 2001.
the graph - almost exclusively regions located in the new member states entering the
European Union in 2004.13 The estimated values range between 0:21  0:3 for the RV
method and 0:28  0:38 for the HM method, implying an average increase in GDP per
capita between 21%  30% and 28%  38% respectively for a doubling of the value of
market access, depending on the time period and method used. Market access explains
between 27% 30% of the variation of income. The implied values for , the elasticity
of substitution, are plausible as well, when assuming a standard  = 23 : they range in
between 7:04 and 3:85.
The determination of wages by market access of a region may appear well established
through the results, however the attention should be turned to two important issues:
First, the use of GDP data, or the estimation of it as through the trade equation, creates
an immediate endogeneity problem for the wage equation, where GDP per capita, as a
proxy for wages, is regressed on market access. Second, as Redding & Venables (2004)
and Breinlich (2006) point out, the returns on the mobile input should equalize across
countries and regions by assumption, and would therefore be captured in the constant
not the error term, which would create another source of endogeneity.
13See table 11 for the corresponding baseline estimation for only EU15 regions and gure 6 for the
plot in the period of 2008 - 2009 in appendix C.
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Table 6: Instrumental Variable Estimation (1999 - 2001)
Regressor ln(MA RV) (1) ln(GDPpc) (2) ln(MA HM) (3) ln(GDPpc) (4)
Distance -1.956e-03*** -0.0013882***
(-25.05) (-16.47)
ln(MA RV) 0.24992***
(8.4192)
ln(MA HM) 0.35221***
(8.4285)
Adjusted R2 0.7172 0.2868 0.5224 0.3347
Observations 248 248 248 248
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01. t-statistic in round
brackets based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Due to the nature of the regressor in
columns (2) and (4) being itself generated from a prior regression, t-statistics should also be reported
based on bootstrapped standard errors, which however could not be done. ln(MA XY) is the
logarithm of the market access in the period 1999 - 2001 calculated with the respective method.
4.2 Robustness Checks
It is apparent that by construction of the market access variable one should be con-
cerned about endogeneity. The domestic component, even when not explicitly calcu-
lated, as in the RV method, shows the local expenditure on the considered good. This
expenditure is dependent on the income, which itself is of course dependent on the
wage, the dependent variable of the estimation, creating a potential reverse causality.
As Head & Mayer (2004) note, in the extreme case where transport costs are innitely
high, only local expenditure enters the market access. Redding & Venables (2004)
address this concern with excluding the domestic component from the estimation and
regressing wages exclusively on what they call foreign market access. This in turn
however eliminates the arguably most important source of high wages, in particular
where market access is high: the demand from the own region. Exemplifying this by
taking the Belgium capital region Brussels (NUTS2 code BE10), market access cal-
culated with the HM method for the period of 1999 - 2001 is reduced by 53% when
excluding the domestic region, while at the same time, the neighboring regions Flem-
ish Brabant (NUTS code BE24) and Walloon Brabant (NUTS code BE31) lose only
5% and 3% respectively, as they draw most of their total market access not from the
own region, but from the capital region of Brussels, which is still included in their
exclusively non-domestic market access.14
Another approach to solve the simultaneity problem is to nd a good instrument
14This also becomes apparent in table 4, as described above, showing the shares in market access
for domestic region, country, Europe and the rest of the world.
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Table 7: Lagged Market Access and Fixed Eects
Regressor ln(GDPpc) ln(GDPpc) ln(GDPpc) ln(GDPpc) ln(GDPpc) ln(GDPpc)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(MA RV) 0.2372*** 0.5309*** 0.2431***
(8.969) (5.138) (9.784)
ln(MA HM) 0.3106*** 0.8714*** 0.2333***
(15.799) (27.963) (10.335)
Time FE no no yes yes yes yes
Region FE no no yes yes no no
Country FE no no no no yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.2449 0.2616 0.9754 0.9864 0.8371 0.8423
Observations 744 744 992 992 992 992
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01. t-statistic in round
brackets based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Due to the nature of the regressor being
itself generated from a prior regression, t-statistics should also be reported based on bootstrapped
standard errors, which however could not be done. ln(MA XY) is the logarithm of the market access
calculated with the respective method. The dependent variable is the logarithm of GDP per capita,
average per period lagged by one period in columns (1) and (2), and average for the period for
columns (3) to (6). Estimations for column (3) and (4) include time and region xed eects, for
column (5) and (6) include time and country xed eects. Coecients for all time, region and
country xed eects are not reported.
that is not inuenced by wages, but is highly correlated with the calculated market
access. As gure 1 shows, the distance to Luxembourg appears to qualify well for
this task as a purely geographical variable.15 Table 6 shows the results for the IV
estimation for the period of 1999 - 2001: in the rst stage, distance, as the instrumental
variable already explains 71% and 52% respectively of variation in regional market
access (column 1 for RV method and column (2) for HM method). In the second
stage, the coecients in columns (2) and (4) are slightly smaller, but they remain
highly economically signicant and hence very similar in magnitude and are just as
signicant statistically as in the baseline estimation.
However also the non-domestic component raises concerns: as Breinlich (2006) notes,
shocks to wages may be spatially correlated, such as a nationwide strike. To control
for such eects, I estimate the same baseline regression with a one-period lag (Table
7, columns (1) and (2)). Country-specic eects that are time-persistent, e.g. insti-
tutional setting, can be controlled for by including a country xed eect (Table 7,
columns (5) and (6)). Other unobserved variables may be region-specic and time-
15Breinlich (2006) includes a second instrument, country size, to account for a large national market
in the light of border eects. In my analysis such measure is insignicant for EU25, but vagely
signicant for EU15. Regional size is highly signicant with a negative sign, however the endogeneity
here is clear: administrative regions are man-made smaller in metropolitan areas because of higher
population in a smaller area, where income, and hence market access is higher.
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persistent (Table 7, columns (5) and (6)). None of these xed eects or lagged variables
reduce the signicance of market access for the determination of wages.16 All controls
for robustness underline the importance of market access in the determination of the
remuneration for the immobile factor.
5 The Role of EU Funds
The European Union Regional Policy, as briey characterized in section 1, aims to
promote cohesion among European regions in economic, social and territorial terms.
The means to achieve these forms of cohesion are specied in the objectives, and I here
focus on Objective 1 and the Cohesion Fund, and Objective 2. The theoretical and
econometric framework setup in the previous sections allow to analyze, whether these
two objectives have achieved a measurable eect, as they are directly concerned with
economic prosperity.
To evaluate the success of this aim in the proposed theoretical framework in section 2,
I now analyze the change in wages, as postulated in equation (17).
5.1 Change in Wages
The estimation of the change in wages, is expectedly similar to the estimation of the
wage equation (25) in section 4. Recalling equation (17) from section 2:
 lnwr;t =
1

( ln ct  ln at)  

lnxr;t +
1

lnMAr;t
This is estimated analogous equation to (25) as
lnwr;t   lnwr;t 1 = t + 1

(lnMAr;t   lnMAr;t 1) + r;t (26)
Again t captures the time-variant at and at 1 as well as a change in the elasticity
of substitution ct. The return on the mobile factor, xr;t and xr;t 1 is captured in the
error term r;t.
17
In section 5.2 I rst estimate equation (26) and control for initial GDP and the change
of human capital. Afterwards in section 5.3 I inspect with the estimation of equation
(27) whether and how funds from the EU regional policy facilities inuenced the change
in wages and interacted through the assumed channels.
16While the value for the coecient shoots up when introducing a regional xed eect (Columns
(3) and (4)), in both cases the intercept, not displayed in the table, also drops signicantly. The
coecients have no economic interpretation, only their signicance is important.
17The same possibility of it being captured in the constant as in the equation (25) remains. See
section 4.2 for robustness tests in this respect.
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Figure 4: Change of Market Access (HM method) and Change in GDP 1999 - 2009
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Note: Distance to Luxembourg in kilometers and market access relative to Luxembourg (LU00 =
100). Market access calculated with HM method for period from 1999 - 2001.
Data for the EU Regional Funds comes from (Gallo et al. , 2011; Dall'erba & Le Gallo,
2008, 2007; Dall'erba, 2005) and EU DG Regio. I follow Lopez-Rodriguez et al. (2007)
in proxying human capital with by the share of the population aged 25 - 59 (aged 25-64
for 2008) with an educational attainment of at least upper secondary education.18
5.2 Baseline Estimation of Change in Wages
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of table 8 report the results for the baseline estimation of
the change in wages. Column (1) shows that on average for all 248 regions a doubling
of the market access over the entire time period from 1999 - 2009 resulted on average
in an increase in GDP per capita of 90%. Columns (2) and (3) allow the coecient to
vary between old and new member states, and Objective 1 and 2 regions respectively.
The result is revealing: while in the old member states a doubling of the market access
of a region resulted in an increase of GDP per capita of only 63%, for new member
states it yielded a massive 147%.
18Unfortunately data for Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia and the UK Highlands is uncomplete due to
a change in NUTS2 regions.
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A similar picture is painted when dierentiating between Objective 1 and 2 regions:19
an improvement of market access by 100% for the former yielded a 98% increase in
GDP per capita, while it was only 70% for an Objective 2 region. The results hint at
the higher impact of market access improvement for lesser developed regions. Figure
4 displays this relationship graphically.
To further establish this relationship, columns (4) to (9) of table 8 control for two
standard controls in growth regressions, the change in human capital over the same
time period and the initial GDP per capita, as classical growth theory predicts higher
growth rates for initially poorer regions.20 Only controlling for initial GDP expectedly
lowers the coecients in all three specications, columns (4), (5) and (6), but all
remain highly signicant. Additionally controlling for the change in human capital
shows interesting results, in particular for the specication splitting between Objective
1 and 2 regions in column (9): while market access retains an economic and statistical
signicance for both groups, the change in human capital is only statistically signicant
for Objective 2 regions. A 10% increase in human capital in an Objective 2 region
yielded on average an increase of 8:8% in GDP per capita. The increase of market
access for comparison by 10% yielded only an increase by 5:4% in an Objective 2
region, while boosting GDP per capita in an Objective 1 region by 9:4%. The explained
variation of the change in wages varies between 65%  82%.
5.3 Estimation of the Eect of Regional Policy Funds
In the light of these results it is interesting to see whether nancial ows from the
respective Objective 1 and 2, and Cohesion funds in the programming period of 2000
- 2006 had an inuence on the change of wages over the time period of 1999 to 2009.
To estimate this eect I come back to equation (26). The impact of funds from the
regional policy can then be estimated with
lnwr;t   lnwr;t 1 = t + 1

(lnMAr;t   lnMAr;t 1) +HrEUr + r;t (27)
where EUr is a vector of the dierent funding sources and Hr a vector of possible
interaction channels.
As previously discussed, Objective 1 and the Cohesion Fund have the aim to allow
poorer regions to converge, having a primary focus on the nancing of infrastructure
19Note that, as explained in section 1 Objective 1 regions are comprised of almost all new mem-
ber state regions, except for Prague, Bratislava and Cyprus, and a smaller number from peripheral
countries. The similarity in the direction of the coecients in columns (2) and (3) is therefore no
surprise.
20See Mankiw et al. (1992) for the seminal work including human capital in a standard neoclassical
Solow-Swan model.
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projects, while Objective 2 is concerned with better developed regions that face struc-
tural problems, having an operative focus on investing in human capital. Relying on
the results from the previous section, market access and human capital are in the
following taken as proxies for the channels of the two objectives. For the latter the
direct link is clear, while for the former, the connection can primarily be drawn by the
connection between infrastructure and transport costs in the theoretical model.
For the funds to fulll their aim, funds from Objective 2 should impact wages through
an increase in human capital and for Objective 1 through an increase in market access.
However, as Breinlich (2006) and Lopez-Rodriguez et al. (2007) show specically for
the case of European regions, human capital itself appears to be one of the major
channels of market access to impact wages, making the eects of nancial ows from
Objective 2 funds dicult to disentangle. This is also visible in table 8 column (9),
where a change in market access remains economically and statistically signicant for
the determination of the change in wages in Objective 2 regions. Likewise it would be
plausible that an improvement of market access in Objective 1 regions occurs through
the improvement of human capital. In light of the results from section 5.2 this seems not
to be the case however, as Objective 1 regions do not appear to be positively inuenced
by a change in human capital, where the coecient is statistically insignicant.
The results in table 9 show clearly that a direct connection between the nancial ows
and a measurable improvement in market access in receiving regions is not present.
Including and interacting the respective ows from Objective 1 and 2 facilities with
the proposed channels yield (almost) no signicant coecients, neither statistically nor
economically. Should there have been a link between market access improvement and
nancial ows through Objective 1 facilities, the interaction term between both should
have exhibited a positive sign and statistical signicance. In the case for funds from
Objective 2, a positive and signicant coecient would have been expected in both
interaction terms with market access and human capital, as explained above. This is
not the case.
Column (1) reports the results for the estimation with all EU25 countries. To make sure
the insignicance of the coecients was not simply due to omitted variables possibly
resulting from the enlargement in 2004, I also estimate the regression with a subsample
comprising only the regions of EU15. The result of the lack of a robust connection
between changes in market access and human capital and the ows of money from EU
Regional Policy facilities clearly does not vanish.
The results are overall not surprising in the sense that the funds seem to matter
very little. As briey portrayed in section 1, the economic literature has struggled to
establish a conclusive and unconditional favorable link in general.
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Table 9: Impact of funds from Objective 1 and Objective 2
Regressor  ln(GDPpc) (1)  ln(GDPpc) (2)
Initial GDP per capita -2.0621e-07 2.299e-06*
(-0.1843) (2.320)
 MA 0.30915 0.5107*
(0.8852) (2.174)
 HC 1.2213 1.128
(0.9358) (1.237)
ln Obj. 1 9.1927e-03 2.809e-03
(1.4734) (0.669)
ln Obj. 2 1.8247e-03 2.123e-05
(0.2740) (0.005)
 MA x ln Obj. 1 2.8943e-02 6.042e-03
(1.6644) (0.519)
 HC x ln Obj. 1 -7.2982e-02 3.565e-03
(-1.0981) (0.079)
 MA x ln Obj. 2 1.3032e-02 1.755e-03
(0.7075) (0.145)
 HC x ln Obj. 2 -3.2415e-02 -2.948e-02
(-0.4600) -0.610
EU15 only no yes
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.716
Observations 166 151
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01. t-statistic in round
brackets based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Due to the nature of the regressor being
itself generated from a prior regression, t-statistics should also be reported based on bootstrapped
standard errors, which however could not be done. The independent variable is the dierence of the
logarithms of GDP per capita in the periods of 1999 - 2001 and 2008 - 2009. The regressors are inital
GDP per capita in the period of 1999 - 2001, changes in market access and human capital of the time
period. MA is the change the market access, calculated with the HM method, and  HC the
change in human capital. ln Obj. 1 and ln Obj. 2 are the funds allocated to the respective region in
per capita terms in the programming period of 2000 - 2006. The lower four rows of regressors display
the coecients for the interaction terms between the concerned variables.
28
6 Conclusion
In this thesis I set up a standard New Economic Geography model in a similar fashion
as Redding & Venables (2004) and estimate it with European data. It is closely related
to Head & Mayer (2006) and Breinlich (2006) in applying the framework to explain
regional dierences of income in the European Union. My analysis contributes to
this literature by extending the number of inspected regions to 248, encompassing all
continental regions of all 25 European Union member states of 2006.
The theoretical framework culminates in two structural equations that make the em-
pirical analysis possible: the trade equation and the wage equation. I estimate the
trade equation with two distinct but closely related approaches that have slightly dif-
ferent requirements of data. One follows closely the original methodology of Redding
& Venables (2004) and can be estimated without internal trade data. The other ap-
proach follows the methodology of Head & Mayer (2004, 2006), where internal trade
data is required and has the advantage to capture the home bias in trade. I contrast
the results of both methods and highlight the dierences rooting in the construction
and underlying premisses of the two approaches.
Using the results of the trade equation, I calculate the market access for all regions
and estimate the wage equation, relating the wage level of a region to its proximity
to demand sources. The results are well in line with the ndings of other authors
and allow a detailed analysis of the Economic Geography of Europe. A clear core-
periphery gradient is found. Estimating the rst dierence of the wage equation, also
reveals forces that hint at a catching-up of backward regions. A dierentiated analysis
between old and new member states after the enlargement of the European Union in
2004 highlights this eect. Similarly, the estimation reveals the importance of changes
in human capital, in particular in regions that benet from Objective 2 of EU Regional
Policy. Incomes in Objective 1 regions are found to be primarily aected by market
access, which hints at the importance of basic infrastructure as a prerequisite for
economic prosperity.
The wide geographical coverage allows an analysis of the impact of the EU Regional
Policy on these previously found determinants of change. However, as previous authors,
I cannot nd an economically or statistically signicant impact of nancial facilities
eminating from the Objective 1, Cohesion Fund or Objective 2 policies. This result
is not a large surprise, as the magnitude of the funds in per capita terms is even in
regions with the highest inows marginal with respect to the time period of 7 years
and own economic output.
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A Appendix: Regional Geographic Data
Geographic data for European regions is assembled from a number of sources and then
merged and constructed analogous to Mayer & Zignago (2011).
Regions are NUTS2 regions in the categorization of 2006. Area and population size
data is taken from ESPON ReRisk Area Population Data (years 2005 and 2003 for UK
regions). The capital of a region is assumed to be its centroid. In region that have no
administrative capital, the largest city by population size is assumed to be the centroid
(This is the case only for the UK, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). The centroid of
a region that fully encompasses a smaller region has the same centroid as this enclave
(This is the case only for the metropolitan areas of London, UKI1 and UKI2, and the
greater Prague area, CZ01 and CZ02). Latitude and longitude are coded using the
Google Data API, distances are calculated as simple great circle distances, following
Paillacar (2009) despite criticism from Head & Mayer (2002) who propose a population
weighted distance calculated as dij =
P
mi
P
nj
popm
popi
popn
popj
distmn. Internal distance of
a region are calculated as i dii =
2
3
p
area= following (Mayer & Zignago, 2011; Head
& Mayer, 2002). Regional ocial regional languages come from DG Regio and the
CIA Factbook.
NUTS2 regions considered: AT11 (Burgenland (A)), AT12 (Niederosterreich), AT13
(Wien), AT21 (Karnten), AT22 (Steiermark), AT31 (Oberosterreich), AT32 (Salzburg),
AT33 (Tirol), AT34 (Vorarlberg), BE10 (Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest), BE21 (Prov.
Antwerpen), BE22 (Prov. Limburg (B)), BE23 (Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen), BE24
(Prov. Vlaams Brabant), BE25 (Prov. West-Vlaanderen), BE31 (Prov. Brabant
Wallon), BE32 (Prov. Hainaut), BE33 (Prov. Liege), BE34 (Prov. Luxembourg
(B)), BE35 (Prov. Namur), CY00 (Cyprus), CZ01 (Praha), CZ02 (Stredn Cechy),
CZ03 (Jihozapad), CZ04 (Severozapad), CZ05 (Severov chod), CZ06 (Jihov chod),
CZ07 (Stredn Morava), CZ08 (Moravskoslezsko), DE11 (Stuttgart), DE12 (Karl-
sruhe), DE13 (Freiburg), DE14 (Tubingen), DE21 (Oberbayern), DE22 (Niederbay-
ern), DE23 (Oberpfalz), DE24 (Oberfranken), DE25 (Mittelfranken), DE26 (Unter-
franken), DE27 (Schwaben), DE30 (Berlin), DE41 (Brandenburg - Nordost), DE42
(Brandenburg - Sudwest), DE50 (Bremen), DE60 (Hamburg), DE71 (Darmstadt),
DE72 (Gieen), DE73 (Kassel), DE80 (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), DE91 (Braun-
schweig), DE92 (Hannover), DE93 (Luneburg), DE94 (Weser-Ems), DEA1 (Dusseldorf),
DEA2 (Koln), DEA3 (Munster), DEA4 (Detmold), DEA5 (Arnsberg), DEB1 (Koblenz),
DEB2 (Trier), DEB3 (Rheinhessen-Pfalz), DEC0 (Saarland), DED1 (Chemnitz), DED2
(Dresden), DED3 (Leipzig), DEE0 (Sachsen-Anhalt), DEF0 (Schleswig-Holstein), DEG0
(Thuringen), DK01 (Hovedstaden), DK02 (Sjlland), DK03 (Syddanmark), DK04
(Midtjylland), DK05 (Nordjylland), EE00 (Estonia), ES11 (Galicia), ES12 (Princi-
pado de Asturias), ES13 (Cantabria), ES21 (Pais Vasco), ES22 (Comunidad Foral
de Navarra), ES23 (La Rioja), ES24 (Aragon), ES30 (Comunidad de Madrid), ES41
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(Castilla y Leon), ES42 (Castilla-la Mancha), ES43 (Extremadura), ES51 (Catalu~na),
ES52 (Comunidad Valenciana), ES53 (Illes Balears), ES61 (Andalucia), ES62 (Region
de Murcia), FI13 (Ita-Suomi), FI18 (Etela-Suomi), FI19 (Lansi-Suomi), FI1A (Pohjois-
Suomi), FI20 (Aland), FR10 (^Ile de France), FR21 (Champagne-Ardenne), FR22 (Pi-
cardie), FR23 (Haute-Normandie), FR24 (Centre), FR25 (Basse-Normandie), FR26
(Bourgogne), FR30 (Nord - Pas-de-Calais), FR41 (Lorraine), FR42 (Alsace), FR43
(Franche-Comte), FR51 (Pays de la Loire), FR52 (Bretagne), FR53 (Poitou-Charentes),
FR61 (Aquitaine), FR62 (Midi-Pyrenees), FR63 (Limousin), FR71 (Rho^ne-Alpes),
FR72 (Auvergne), FR81 (Languedoc-Roussillon), FR82 (Provence-Alpes-Co^te d'Azur),
FR83 (Corse), GR11 (Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki), GR12 (Kentriki Makedonia),
GR13 (Dytiki Makedonia), GR14 (Thessalia), GR21 (Ipeiros), GR22 (Ionia Nisia),
GR23 (Dytiki Ellada), GR24 (Sterea Ellada), GR25 (Peloponnisos), GR30 (Attiki),
GR41 (Voreio Aigaio), GR42 (Notio Aigaio), GR43 (Kriti), HU10 (Kozep-Magyarorszag),
HU21 (Kozep-Dunantul), HU22 (Nyugat-Dunantul), HU23 (Del-Dunantul), HU31 (Eszak-
Magyarorszag), HU32 (Eszak-Alfold), HU33 (Del-Alfold), IE01 (Border, Midlands and
Western), IE02 (Southern and Eastern), ITC1 (Piemonte), ITC2 (Valle d'Aosta/Vallee
d'Aoste), ITC3 (Liguria), ITC4 (Lombardia), ITD1 (Provincia Autonoma Bolzano-
Bozen), ITD2 (Provincia Autonoma Trento), ITD3 (Veneto), ITD4 (Friuli-Venezia
Giulia), ITD5 (Emilia-Romagna), ITE1 (Toscana), ITE2 (Umbria), ITE3 (Marche),
ITE4 (Lazio), ITF1 (Abruzzo), ITF2 (Molise), ITF3 (Campania), ITF4 (Puglia), ITF5
(Basilicata), ITF6 (Calabria), ITG1 (Sicilia), ITG2 (Sardegna), LT00 (Lithuania),
LU00 (Luxembourg), LV00 (Latvia), MT00 (Malta), NL11 (Groningen), NL12 (Fries-
land (NL)), NL13 (Drenthe), NL21 (Overijssel), NL22 (Gelderland), NL23 (Flevoland),
NL31 (Utrecht), NL32 (Noord-Holland), NL33 (Zuid-Holland), NL34 (Zeeland), NL41
(Noord-Brabant), NL42 (Limburg (NL)), PL11 (Lodzkie), PL12 (Mazowieckie), PL21
(Malopolskie), PL22 (Slaskie), PL31 (Lubelskie), PL32 (Podkarpackie), PL33 (Swi-
etokrzyskie), PL34 (Podlaskie), PL41 (Wielkopolskie), PL42 (Zachodniopomorskie),
PL43 (Lubuskie), PL51 (Dolnoslaskie), PL52 (Opolskie), PL61 (Kujawsko-Pomorskie),
PL62 (Warminsko-Mazurskie), PL63 (Pomorskie), PT11 (Norte), PT15 (Algarve),
PT16 (Centro (PT)), PT17 (Lisboa), PT18 (Alentejo), SE11 (Stockholm), SE12 (Ostra
Mellansverige), SE21 (Smaland med oarna), SE22 (Sydsverige), SE23 (Vastsverige),
SE31 (Norra Mellansverige), SE32 (Mellersta Norrland), SE33 (Ovre Norrland), SI01
(Vzhodna Slovenija), SI02 (Zahodna Slovenija), SK01 (Bratislavsk kraj), SK02 (Zapadne
Slovensko), SK03 (Stredne Slovensko), SK04 (V chodne Slovensko), UKC1 (Tees Valley
and Durham), UKC2 (Northumberland, Tyne and Wear), UKD1 (Cumbria), UKD2
(Cheshire), UKD3 (Greater Manchester), UKD4 (Lancashire), UKD5 (Merseyside),
UKE1 (East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire), UKE2 (North Yorkshire), UKE3
(South Yorkshire), UKE4 (West Yorkshire), UKF1 (Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire),
UKF2 (Leicestershire, Rutland and Northants), UKF3 (Lincolnshire), UKG1 (Here-
fordshire, Worcestershire and Warks), UKG2 (Shropshire and Staordshire), UKG3
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(West Midlands), UKH1 (East Anglia), UKH2 (Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire), UKH3
(Essex), UKI1 (Inner London), UKI2 (Outer London), UKJ1 (Berkshire, Bucks and
Oxfordshire), UKJ2 (Surrey, East and West Sussex), UKJ3 (Hampshire and Isle of
Wight), UKJ4 (Kent), UKK1 (Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area),
UKK2 (Dorset and Somerset), UKK3 (Cornwall and Isles of Scilly), UKK4 (Devon),
UKL1 (West Wales and The Valleys), UKL2 (East Wales), UKM2 (Eastern Scotland),
UKM3 (South Western Scotland), UKM5 (North Eastern Scotland), UKM6 (High-
lands and Islands), UKN0 (Northern Ireland).
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B Construction of Variables
GDP per capita is Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices at NUTS
level 2 taken from EUROSTAT. GDP for the years 1995 - 2007 for Austria, Italy and
Hungary is from a 2010 version from EUROSTAT as this data is unavailable currently.
Manufacturing production data is taken from the OECD STAN database (PROD:
PROD Production (gross output), current prices, C15T37 Manufacturing)
All monetary values are in 2010 Euros, USD are converted to 2010 EUR using ECB
annual average data.
Table 10: Summary Statistics for the Data
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Trade ow 358685 306400 7492606
Distance 60450 6211.00 4465.041
GDP per capita 248 23556 10756.16
Objective 1 + Cohesion funds 225 537400000 1114301777
Objective 1 + Cohesion funds per capita 225 268.2 509.3136
Objective 2 225 88960000 138845167
Objective 2 per capita 225 51.17 64.71
Population Share with upper 812 23.00 8.01267
secondary education or higher
Population 1736 1839.0 1508.797
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C Further tables and plots
Figure 5: Distance to Luxembourg and Market Access in Period 1999 - 2001
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Note: Distance to Luxembourg in kilometers and market access relative to Luxembourg (LU00 =
100). Market access calculated with RV method for period from 1999 - 2001.
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Table 11: Baseline estimation wage equation 1999 - 2009 for EU15 only
Regressor ln(GDP p.c.) ln(GDP p.c.) ln(GDP p.c.) ln(GDP p.c.)
ln(MA RV) 0.148231***
(13.8169)
ln(MA HM) 0.17547***
(13.4664)
ln(MA) P1 0.170570*** 0.19565***
(8.0091) (8.3155)
ln(MA) P2 0.1489543*** 0.1762672***
(7.0348) (6.9433)
ln(MA) P3 0.1401249*** 0.1750146***
(6.5190) (6.4872)
ln(MA) P4 0.130851*** 0.147507***
(6.0367) (5.0951)
EU15 only yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.2989 0.2988 0.2722 0.2694
Observations 792 792 792 792
Year 1999 - 2009 1999 - 2009 1999 - 2009 1999 - 2009
Note: statistical signicance * at p < 0:1, ** at p < 0:05, *** at p < 0:01, t-statistic in round
brackets. Due to the nature of the regressor being itself generated from a prior regression, t-statistics
should be reported based on bootstrapped standard errors, which however could not be done. The
independent variable is the logarithm of the mean of GDP per capita in the respective period, as
described in the text. The regressors in columns (1) and (2) are the logarithms of the market access
calculated with the RV method in column (1) and HM method in column (2). The regressors in
columns (3) and (4) are the logarithm of the market access in period 1 (P1 = 1999 - 2001), period 2
(P2 = 2002 - 2004), period 3 (P3 = 2005 - 2007) and period 4 (P4 = 2008 - 2009) calculated with
the RV method in column (3) and the HM method in column (4).
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Figure 6: GDP per capita and Market Access in 2008 - 2009
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
Market Access
G
DP
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
AT11
AT12
AT13
AT21AT22
AT31
AT32
AT33 AT34
BE10
BE21
BE22
BE23
BE24
BE25
BE31
BE32
BE33
BE34
BE35
CY00
CZ01
CZ02
CZ03
CZ04CZ05
CZ06
CZ07
CZ08
DE11DE12
DE13
DE14
DE21
DE22
DE23
DE24
DE25
DE26
DE27
DE30
DE41
DE42
DE50
DE60
DE71
DE72
DE73
DE80
DE91
DE9
DE93
DE94
DEA1
DEA2
DEA3
DEA4 DEA5
DEB1DEB2
DEB3
DEC0
DED1
DED2 DED3
DEE0
DEF0
G0
DK01
DK02
DK03DK04DK05
EE00
ES11
ES12 ES13
ES21
ES22
ES23ES24
ES30
ES41
ES42
ES43
ES51
ES52
ES53
ES61
ES62
FI13
FI18
FI19
FI1A
FI20
FR10
FR21
FR22
FR23FR24
FR25
FR26
FR30
FR41
FR42
FR43
FR51
FR52
FR53
FR61FR62
FR63
FR71
FR72FR81
FR82
FR83
GR11
GR12
GR13
GR14
GR21
GR22
GR23
GR24
GR25
GR30
GR41
GR42
GR43
HU10
HU21
HU22
HU23
HU31HU32
HU33
IE01
IE02
ITC1
ITC2
ITC3
ITC4
ITD1
ITD2ITD3ITD4
ITD5
ITE1
ITE2
ITE3
ITE4
ITF1
ITF2
ITF3ITF4
ITF5
ITF6ITG1
ITG2
LT00
LU00
LV00
MT00
NL11
NL12
NL13
NL21 NL22
NL23
NL31
NL32
NL33
NL34
NL41
NL42
PL11
PL12
PL21
PL22
PL31PL32
PL33
PL34
PL41
PL42
PL43
PL51
PL52PL61
PL62
PL63
PT11
PT15
PT16
PT17
PT18
SE11
SE12SE21 S 22
SE23
SE31
SE32SE33
SI01
SI02
SK01
SK02
SK03
SK04
UKC1
UKC2UKD1
UKD2
UKD3
UKD4
UKD5
UKE1
UKE2
UKE3
UKE4
UKF1
UKF2
UKF3
UKG1
UKG2
UKG3
UKH1
UKH2
UKH3
UKI1
UKI2
UKJ1
UKJ2
UKJ3
UKJ4
UKK1
UKK2
UKK3
UKK4
UKL1
UKL2
UKM2
UKM3
UKM5
UKM6 UKN0
10
00
0
20
00
0
40
00
0
25 50 100 200 400
Note: Average GDP per capita in 2008 - 2009 (2010 EURO) and the regions' market access (LU00 =
100) in 2008 - 2009.
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